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What the applicability of mathematics 




We use mathematics to understand the world. This fact lies behind all of modern science and 
technology. Mathematics is the tool used by physicists, engineers, biologists, neuroscientists, 
chemists, astrophysicists and applied mathematicians to investigate, explain, and manipulate the 
world around us. The importance of mathematics to science cannot be overstated. It is the daily 
and ubiquitous tool of millions of scientists and engineers throughout the world and in all areas of 
science. The undeniable power of mathematics not only to predict but also to explain phenomena 
is what physics Nobel laureate Eugene Wigner dubbed the “unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics in the natural sciences” (Wigner, 1960). 
 
Yet the success of mathematics in explaining the world belies a great mystery: why is that 
possible? Why are our abstract thought and our manipulation of symbols able to successfully 
explain the workings of distant stars, the patterns of stripes on a tiger, and the weirdest behaviour 
of the smallest units of matter? Why is applying mathematics to the real world even possible? 
 
This is a question in the philosophy of mathematics. The traditional approach to answering it is to 
first decide (hopefully on rational grounds) what to believe about the nature of mathematics and 
its objects of study, and then to explore what this philosophical standpoint says about the 
applicability of mathematics to the world. In this chapter, I take a different approach. 
 
I take as given the existence of applied mathematics. On this foundational axiom, I ask the 
question “what does the existence of applied mathematics say about the philosophy of 
mathematics?” In this way, we treat the existence of applied mathematics as a lens through which 
to examine competing claims about the nature of mathematics. What then do we mean by the 
existence of applied mathematics, by the philosophy of mathematics, and what are the claims on 
the nature of mathematics? 
Applied mathematics 
 
It is not easy to define applied mathematics. The authoritative Princeton Companion to Applied 
Mathematics (Higham, 2015) sidesteps this difficulty by instead describing what applied 
mathematics is based on what applied mathematicians do. This is a strategy, the Companion 
argues (Higham, 2015a, p.1), with some distinguished historical precedent (for example, Courant 
& Robbins, 1941). 
 
In this chapter I borrow a concise definition of applied mathematics from mathematician Garrett 
Birkhoff (1911-1996), who took inspiration from physicist Lord Rayleigh (1842-1919): 
“mathematics becomes ‘applied’ when it is used to solve real-world problems” (quoted in Higham, 
2015a, p.1). The breadth of this definition, which includes “everything from counting change to 
climate change” (Wilson, 2014, p.176), is important. It means that we can use the shorthand 
“applied mathematics” for any application of mathematics to understanding the real world, and 
the name “applied mathematician” for any person doing so. This usage of “applied mathematics” 
and “applied mathematician” means we avoid any confusion over how a particular example or 
person might be categorised according to contingent academic disciplines in the workplace. 
 
For our purposes, then, applied mathematics, is simply mathematics which is applied. An applied 
mathematician is anyone who applies mathematics. 
 
In a book like this we can take it for granted that the existence of applied mathematics is 
undisputed. Its chapters present case after case of the overwhelming success and importance of 
the application of mathematics to the world around us. Applied mathematics not only predicts the 
outcome of experiment, it also provides understanding and explanation of the forces, fields, and 
principles at work. Indeed, “Mathematics … has become the definition of explanation in the 
physical sciences.” (Barrow, 2000). This is what I mean by the existence of applied mathematics, 
a useful phrase which I will abbreviate to TEAM.  
 
Here I take mathematics, science, and technology seriously, in that I believe they have something 
important and objective to say about the world. While there are cultural and social concerns with 
the institutional forms of transmission of mathematics, I firmly reject the “woefully inadequate 
explanation” (Barrow, 2000) that mathematics is merely a social construct. This postmodern 
fallacy has been hilariously exposed by Sokal (1996, 2008) and others. As a mathematician and 
scientist, I also reject the notion, fashionable among some famous physicists, that philosophy has 
nothing useful to say about science; see for example Weinberg (1992), or Krauss (2012). This 
chapter is evidence against that view. 
The four schools of the philosophy of mathematics 
What is mathematics? What is the status of the objects it studies? How can we obtain reliable 
knowledge of them? These are the general types of questions which animate and define the 
philosophy of mathematics, and on which we will focus below. If you think this sounds vague, I 
agree with you. In Philosophy of Mathematics: selected readings (Benacerraf & Putnam, 1983) 
compiled by the highly influential philosophers of mathematics Paul Benacerraf and Hilary 
Putnam, the editors write in their first sentence “It would be difficult to say just what comprises the 
philosophy of mathematics”.  
 
But we have to talk about something, so in what follows I present some of the main ideas from 
the long history of this vaguely-defined area of philosophy. This is not an exhaustive study of all 
of the schools of the philosophy of mathematics, neither will we see all of the main areas of study. 
Those in the know might find it shocking that I do not mention Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, or 
Wittgenstein, and spend scant time on Kant and Hume. Their ideas fill these pages through their 
influence on their contemporaries and those who came after them and on whose ideas I focus. 
And while I try to present some historical development, this can only ever be cursory in a single 
chapter covering over 2,500 years from Pythagoras to the present. I am painfully aware of the 
Western bias in my presentation, with no mention of the great Indian, Chinese, and Arabic 
traditions. I hope that you are intrigued enough to follow the references. If you are eager to start 
right now, then Bostock (2009) gives a highly readable and comprehensive introduction, 
Benacerraf & Putnam (1983) contains selected key papers and readings, Horsten (2016) is an 
excellent starting point for an educational internet journey, and Mancosu (2008) is a survey of the 
modern perspective. But I hope you will read this chapter first. 
 
The chapter divides the philosophy of mathematics into four schools, each of which has its own 
section. This division is broadly accepted and historically relevant, but not without controversy. I 
have also tried to present the arguments of smaller subschools of the philosophy of mathematics. 
Sometimes this has required discussing a subschool when a theme arises, even if historically it 
does not belong in that section. I hope that historians of the philosophy of mathematics, and the 
philosophers themselves, will forgive me. 
 
Mostly I have tried to avoid jargon, but there are some important concepts that I have tried to 
develop as they arise. However, there are two words needed from the start: ontology and 
epistemology. Ontology concerns the nature of being. In terms of mathematics: what do we mean 
when we say that a mathematical object exists? Are mathematical objects pure and outside of 
space and time, as the platonist insists, or are they purely mental, as the intuitionist would argue, 
or the fairy tales of the fictionalist? Epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge, how we can 
come to have it, and what justifies our belief in it. Speaking loosely, we can say that if ontology is 
concerns the nature of what we know, then epistemology concerns how we know it.  
The lens 
I focus on what TEAM says about the philosophy of mathematics. It is important to distinguish 
this concern with what the applicability of mathematics says about the nature of mathematics from 
a concern (even a philosophical one) with the nature of the work done in applying mathematics. 
This latter question focusses on the praxis of applying mathematics: how applied mathematicians 
choose which problems to work on, how they turn a real-world problem into a mathematical one, 
what their aesthetic is, how they choose a solution method, how they communicate their work, 
and related questions. See for example Davis & Hersh (1981), Ruelle (2007), Mancosu (2008), 
and Higham (2015). 
 
In training our TEAM lens on the four main schools of the philosophy of mathematics, we bring 
into focus some aspects of old questions. This is complementary to a more modern focus on the 
so-called “philosophy of real mathematics” (Barrow-Green & Siegmund-Schultze, 2015, p.58). 
This “new wave” as outlined in the introduction to Mancosu (2008), currently avoids the daunting 
ontological question of why mathematics is applicable, and focusses instead on expanding the 
epistemological objects of study to include “fruitfulness, evidence, visualisation, diagrammatic 
reasoning, understanding, explanation” (Mancosu, 2008, p.1) and more besides. These everyday 
epistemological issues raised by working with mathematics are used to refine what is meant by 
applied mathematics, to study how applied mathematics and its objects of study relate to the rest 
of mathematics, and what mathematical value there is in applied mathematics. Indeed, Pincock 
(2009, p. 184) states “a strong case can be made that significant epistemic, semantic and 
metaphysical consequences result from reflecting on applied mathematics”. The interested reader 
is referred to the excellent overviews collected in Mancosu (2008) and Bueno & Linnebo (2009). 
 
I take TEAM as axiomatic in order to examine the claims of various schools of the philosophy of 
mathematics. This is distinct from those like Quine (1948) and Putnam (1971) who take TEAM as 
axiomatic in order to provide a justification for “faith” in mathematics. As outlined by Bostock 
(2009, pp. 275 ff), the Quine/Putnam position is that mathematics is similar to the physical 
sciences in the sense that both postulate the existence of objects which are not directly 
perceptible with human senses. In the case of mathematics, this includes the integers, while for 
the physical sciences, this includes atoms, to take an example in each field. The Quine/Putnam 
position is that mathematics as well as the physical sciences should be exposed to the “tribunal 
of experience”. In particular, since our atomic theory leads to predictions which conform to our 
experience, we should accept the existence of atoms as real. Crucially, claim Quine and Putnam, 
since all our physical theories are mathematical in nature, and since those theories work, we must 
accept the existence of the mathematical entities on which those theories depend as also being 
real. The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is that we must believe that mathematical 
objects exist because mathematics works. We will return to the indispensability argument, but I 
reiterate that we will use TEAM as an axiom for examining competing claims on the nature of 
mathematics, rather than using TEAM as an axiom for a new claim on the nature of mathematics. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We will examine each of the four schools 
in turn, introducing their main ideas, explaining their ontology and epistemology, and giving a brief 
overview of their history and structure. Within each school’s section, we will use the TEAM lens 
to bring into focus the challenges faced by the school’s followers as they attempt to explain the 
applicability of mathematics. We end with a discussion and conclusion. 
Platonism 
The platonist believes that mathematical objects are real and exist independently of humans in 
the same way that stars exist independently of us. Stars burn in all ignorance of us, and while 
their properties are discoverable by humans, they are independent of us. The same is true, says 
the platonist, of the existence and properties of numbers, and of all mathematical objects. Thus 
the platonist mathematician believes that we discover mathematics, rather than invent it.  
 
The platonist position is that all abstract objects are real. An “abstract object” is one which is both 
entirely nonphysical and entirely nonmental. The triangle formed by the three beams over my 
head is an entirely physical object. When I hold it in my mind, and as you now attempt to picture 
it in yours, we have a mental object which is drawn from our experiences of the physical. But this 
mental object is still not yet a platonic object. For the platonist there exists in a third “realm” apart 
from the physical and mental ones the perfect, ideal form of a triangle, of which the imperfect 
triangles in our minds, and the still less imperfect ones in our physical world, are merely poor 
approximations. 
 
The platonist does not believe that mathematical objects are drawn off or abstracted from the 
physical world; rather, that they exist in a realm of perfect, idealised forms outside of space and 
time. But what does “existence” mean in this statement? Existence usually refers to an object 
embedded in time and space, yet these platonic forms are taken to be outside of time and space. 
Their existence is of a different type to all other forms of existence of which we know. We can say 
that as I type this my laptop rests on an oak table in New Zealand early in 2017. We can say that 
our sun will be in the Milky Way galaxy next year, and that Ceaser lay bleeding in Rome two 
millennia ago. The verbs “rest”, “be”, “bleed” in these statements are fancy ways of saying “is”, 
and the locations and times in each example are not two pieces of information but one: a single 
point in the fabric of spacetime which Albert Einstein (1879-1955) wove for us a century ago. By 
contrast, platonic objects “are” in a “place” outside of spacetime. 
 
Platonism is the oldest of our four schools, and for many mathematicians in history this 
perspective was taken to be natural and obvious – and this remains true for the typical 
mathematician or scientist today (Bostock, 2009, p. 263). There is some evidence that Plato (427-
347 BCE) held this view (Cooper, 1997), possibly swayed towards the life of the mind and away 
from the life of the engaged citizen philosopher after his great mentor Socrates was condemned 
to death. Plato presented his theory of forms in his Phaedo, and developed it in his Republic 
(Cooper, 1997), with its enduring image of a shackled humanity deluded by shadows cast by ideal 
forms on a cave wall. It is much less clear that the platonism we are discussing here was a view 
held by Plato, since in later life Plato saw mathematical forms as being intermediaries between 
ideal forms and perceptible objects in our world (Bostock, 2009, p. 16). For this reason I do not 
capitalise the word platonism. 
 
Mathematical platonism is the position that mathematical objects have a reality or existence 
independent not only of space and time but also of the human mind. Within this statement are the 
three claims that (1) mathematical objects exist, (2) they are abstract (they sit outside of 
spacetime), and (3) they are independent of humans or other intelligent agents (Linnebo, 2013). 
All three claims have been challenged by various schools, but the claim of independence sets 
platonism apart from the other schools, as we shall see. For the platonist, the concept of number, 
the concept of a group, the notion of infinity – all of these would exist without humans, and even, 
remarkably, without the physical universe. The platonist ontology is that mathematical objects are 
real, the realest things that exist. 
 
But how can we know about them? Even mathematicians are physical beings containing mental 
processes and which are embedded in space and time, so how can they access this platonic 
realm, which sits outside of spacetime? The only platonist answer to this epistemological problem 
is that we know about these abstract objects a priori – that is, that they are innate, and 
independent of sensory evidence.  
 
This is surely an unsatisfactory answer. To say that we know something a priori is merely to 
rename the fact that we do not know how we know it. It is dodging the issue – begging the 
question. If the innateness claim is taken to its extreme, the idea that every abstract concept that 
humanity might ever uncover is somehow hardwired from birth into a finite brain of finite storage 
capacity seems questionable to say the least. And where is the information encoded which is 
uploaded into the developing foetal brain? DNA has a finite, if colossal, storage capacity (Extance, 
2016). 
 
The other option is that (at least) the human mind somehow has the capacity to access the 
platonic realm. But how can a physical, mental being access a realm outside of those two realms? 
Plato himself saw this epistemological problem as a grave issue, and in his later life he moved 
away from the viewpoint which bears his name, as we saw above.  
 
This problem of epistemological access was precisely formulated by Benacerraf (1973). By 
breaking the problem into its constituent assumptions and deductions, Benacerraf gave 
philosophers of mathematics more precise targets at which to aim. There have been many 
responses to this challenge, as we shall see. But as summarised in Horsten (2016), the 
fundamental problem of a how a “flesh and blood” mathematician can access the platonic realm 
“is remarkably robust under variation of epistemological theory” – that is, “[t]he platonist therefore 
owes us a plausible account of how we (physically embodied humans) are able” to access the 
platonic realm. 
 
Such an account is elusive, although attempts are being made; see (Balauger, 2016, section 5) 
for an excellent summary. It is worth noting here that even ardent platonists such as Kurt Gödel 
(1906-1978) failed to avoid dodging the issue. Gödel is a central figure in the philosophy of 
mathematics. As we shall see, he was a platonist, who destroyed both logicism and formalism, 
and shackled the consistency of intuitionistic arithmetic to that of classical arithmetic (Ferreirós, 
2008, p. 151), where consistency means that contradictions cannot be derived. But returning to 
the issue of epistemological access, we see for example, in Gödel (1947, pp. 483-4) how he skips 
over it by stating “axioms force themselves on us as being true. I don’t see why we should have 
less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.” 
But how do we come by such intuitions? Whether they are innate (following the great Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804)) or acquired (following the equally great David Hume (1711-1776)) there 
remains the question of how mental events correlated with physical brains localised in spacetime 
are able to have them. 
 
Platonism is a kind of realism. The realist believes that mathematical objects exist, and do so 
independently of the human mind. Gödel was certainly a platonic realist (Bostock, 2009, p. 261). 
There are, however, non-platonic forms of realism, and the Quine/Putnam position outlined in the 
Introduction is one example. Quine and Putnam argue that mathematics is real because it 
underpins our physical theories – since they work, mathematics must be true. By “work” here I 
mean precisely what I meant when I defined applied mathematics in the Introduction, and the 
breadth of that definition is important. Since it really does cover everything from counting change 
to climate change, it is not just the use of mathematics in highfalutin scientific domains such as 
climate modelling or fundamental particle physics, but also includes the utility of basic arithmetic 
for counting sheep.  
Platonism under the lens 
Under even the closest scrutiny beneath the TEAM lens, the ontology of platonism remains as 
pure and perfect as its own ideal forms. Since the platonist believes that the physical world is an 
imperfect shadow of a realm of perfect ideal objects, and since in this worldview mathematics is 
itself a very sharp shadow cast by a more ideal form, it is no surprise that our mathematics 
becomes applicable to the physical world. This is not evidence for platonism, but the TEAM lens 
does not reveal any evidence against platonism based on its ontology. 
 
However, as we have seen, cracks appear when we examine the epistemology of platonism – 
that is, when we ask how we are able to have knowledge of the platonic realm of ideal forms. The 
problem of epistemological access is such a serious one that it has prompted a rejection of 
platonism altogether, which we consider in the following three sections. Another approach has 
been to recast platonism in forms which avoids the epistemic access problem.  
 
One example is plenitudinous platonism; see Balauger (1998) and Linsky & Zalta (1995, 2006) 
for two different versions. The central idea is that any mathematical objects which can exist, do 
exist. Summarising how this approach may solve the problem of epistemological access, Linnebo 
(2013) says “If every consistent mathematical theory is true of some universe of mathematical 
objects, then mathematical knowledge will, in some sense, be easy to obtain: provided that our 
mathematical theories are consistent, they are guaranteed to be true of some universe of 
mathematical objects.” 
 
While plenitudinous platonism may solve the epistemic access problem (though this remains 
controversial), it does not yet explain why mathematics is able to be applied to the real world. 
Both platonism and plenitudinous platonism fail to explain why any part of mathematics should 
explain the physical world. Simply because our mathematical objects (platonism), or objects in all 
forms of mathematics (plenitudinous platonism) have an independent existence does not in any 
way explain why they are applicable to the real world around us. Something further is required, 
some explanation of why the platonic realm entails the physical realm. This is what the TEAM 
lens brings sharply into focus for the platonist and plenitudinous platonist arguments. 
 
An idea similar to plenitudinous platonism and which goes some way to addressing epistemic 
concerns was developed by the mathematical physicist Max Tegmark (b. 1967). In a series of 
papers beginning with Tegmark (2008), and explained in layperson terms in Tegmark (2014), 
Tegmark shows that platonic realism about physical objects implies a radical platonic realism 
about mathematical objects. Tegmark argues that the hypothesis that physical objects have an 
independent existence implies his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH): “our physical world 
is an abstract mathematical structure” (Tegmark, 2008, p. 101). He goes on to argue, echoing the 
plenitudinous platonists, that all mathematics which can exist does exist in some sense, that our 
physical world is mathematics (not simply mathematical), and that our minds are themselves self-
aware substructures of this mathematical universe. In the MUH, our selves, our universe, and the 
various multiverses which our physical theories imply are subsets of this grand mathematical 
ensemble.  The MUH addresses (though was not motivated by) the same epistemic concerns 
which motivated the plenitudinous platonists. Tegmark’s ideas have spawned much debate, and 
in the grand tradition he has both defended and amended his hypothesis. It is heartening to see 
a mathematical physicist engaging with philosophers and mathematicians precisely around the 
issues of this chapter. For a starting point of objections and Tegmark’s responses to them, see 
Wikipedia (2017). 
 
As for Quine/Putnam realism, Bostock (2009, p. 278) observes that when considering objections 
to the Quinean position it is important to be careful about what is meant by science and the 
applications of mathematics. He argues that adopting the kind of broad definition of applied 
mathematics that I have taken for this chapter will undermine some of the objections to the 
Quine/Putnam theory, such as those in Parsons (1979/80) and Maddy (1990). However, surely 
we can conclude that the Quine/Putnam idea is attractive under the TEAM lens? 
 
Not so, claims Bostock (2009, pp. 305-6). One problem is the tenuous nature of truth when it is 
defined in this quasi-instrumentalist and utilitarian way, when the only true mathematical things 
are those which currently support our physical theories. As the theories change, so does truth. 
Worse, it is possible to argue that fewer and fewer parts of classical mathematics are required for 
our scientific theories, leading, in the extreme, to the fictionalism of Hartry Field (b. 1946) in which 
absolutely no mathematical objects are necessary; see the discussion in the Formalism section. 
But even if a time-dependent notion of mathematical truth is accepted, Paseau (2007) observes 
that the Quine/Putnam theory leaves unspecified the ontological status of the objects it posits. 
Mathematical statements are true when they are useful, but the Quinean can only shrug when 
asked whether mathematical objects are platonic or have one of the other possible statuses given 
in the following sections. 
 
A final comment concerns the issue of causal agency for Quine and Putnam. Their position  
argues that both quarks and real numbers are to be considered true in as much as they are 
required in our quantum mechanics. Yet the former is a name for something which has a causal 
role in the world, while the latter is the name for a temporarily useful fiction with no causal power. 
Logicism 
To the logicist, mathematics is logic in disguise. All of the varied fields of mathematics are simply 
the fecund outpourings produced when logic combines with interesting definitions (Bostock, 2009, 
p. 114). Mathematics equals logic plus definitions.  
 
In this way, logicists seek to reduce mathematics to something else: logic. This idea can trace its 
lineage to Aristotle (384-322 BCE), who invented logic and tried to formulate his mathematical 
arguments in logical terms. Aristotle rejected Plato’s insistence on a higher realm of ideal objects. 
He did not reject abstraction, but saw it as a process of generalisation of examples in the world. 
To him, the concept of triangle generalised real-world triangles. While Plato believed that all 
Earthly triangles were poor shadows of an ideal triangle with an independent existence beyond 
space and time, Aristotle believed that the concept of a triangle was abstracted from our everyday 
experience of triangles in the world. All Aristotle’s science and mathematics concerns these 
abstractions. His ontology is of generalised ideas in the human mind, and his epistemology is one 
of perception, even in mathematics. (Bostock, 2009, p. 16). Thus to Aristotle, and his 
conceptualist viewpoint just outlined, we invent rather than discover mathematics, which is why I 
described him as having invented logic. 
 
Central to a reductionist view of mathematics is that it can be reduced to something more 
fundamental, that the definitions of mathematics are a type of name or shorthand for relationships 
between sets of the fundamental objects, and that the correspondence of those names with things 
in the real world is of little interest or relevance to mathematics. This type of reduction can be 
called nominalism, since it concerns names, and there are two types (Bostock, 2009, p. 262). One 
is logicism, which reduces mathematics to logic, and states that mathematics is a collection of 
names applied to logical objects. In this view, mathematics is a set of truths derived (or 
discovered) by the use of logic. It is worth noting that in this nominalist account, the mathematical 
objects have no independent existence. The second type of nominalism is the fictionalism of 
Hartry Field, which we discuss below in the section on Formalism. 
 
The logicist ontology is that mathematical objects are merely logical ones in disguise. This 
ontology neatly explains why the varied fields of mathematics are connected: they lie in 
correspondence with one another because their objects of study are at root the same logical 
objects (or collections of them), but with a different overlay of definitions. Moreover, the central 
practice of mathematicians, the proving of theorems, follows well-defined and closely prescribed 
logical rules which themselves guarantee the validity and truth of the outcomes. No matter the 
definitions of the objects, when logical operations are correctly applied to logical objects 
(disguised as mathematical ones) the outcome will certainly be true. 
 
In the logicist worldview mathematicians take disguised logical objects and perform logical 
operations on them. Because of this derivation of new results by a logical analysis of existing 
concepts, it is tempting to refer to these truths as analytic, and thereby to invoke Kant, and in 
particular to set up an opposition with Kant’s synthetic truths derived from experience. But to use 
these words here might be misleading, since Kant himself argued for the synthetic nature of some, 
if not all, mathematical truth (Bostock, 2009, p. 50). To Kant, mathematical truths could not be 
wholly derived by the action of logic; some a priori “intuition” of the objects involved was required. 
In the context of logicism, an analytic truth means one which is derived by the action of logic on 
logical objects plus definitions. This is the usage employed by the key figure Gottlob Frege, as we 
shall see below. 
 
To explore what it means to say that mathematics is logic plus definitions, we can ask: what is a 
number in the logicist worldview? Surely something so fundamental to mathematics, at the core 
of arithmetic, cannot be open to debate? Yet to the logicist, the idea of number is in some sense 
superfluous to the truths of arithmetic. Defining number in a mathematical way simply overlays 
mathematical definitions on logical objects. The overlay is done on multiple objects rather than 
single objects, since if the latter were true then the logicist worldview would be rather barren. 
Merely positing a one-to-one correspondence between mathematical objects and logical ones 
would be no more interesting than compiling a very accurate thesaurus. If I observe that every 
eggplant is an aubergine and that every aubergine is an eggplant, then I can merely use the two 
words interchangeably, and I have not learned anything new about eggplants. Or aubergines. 
Rather, in the logicist worldview, a mathematical definition is powerful because it encodes multiple 
logical objects and the relationships between them. The apparently simple task of defining number 
logically takes us from the budding of logicism in the garden of a man named Frege, through its 
flowering in the care of a man named Russell, to its wilting in the shadow cast by a man named 
Gödel.  
 
The soil for Frege’s garden was laid down by Richard Dedekind (1831-1916). Dedekind is known 
to undergraduate mathematicians for putting the real numbers on a solid basis. He defined them 
by means of “cuts”: an irrational such as the square root of 2 cuts the rational numbers into two 
classes, or sets. One of these contains all of the rational numbers smaller than the square root of 
2, while the other contains all of the rational numbers larger than the square root of 2. This gave 
Dedekind the hope that all of mathematics could be built on logic plus set theory, with sets 
conceived of as logical objects. 
 
This dream was shared by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who is considered the founder of logicism. 
Bostock in his (2009, p. 115) says “Frege’s first, and … greatest contribution … is that he invented 
modern logic.” Extending Dedekind’s ideas, Frege defined number in terms of classes of 
equinumerous classes. In this way, the number 2 is the name for all sets which have two elements. 
Although this smacks of circularity, it is formalised in a way which avoids it. However, Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970) found a paradox nestled at the heart of logicism as conceived by Frege as 
a combination of set theory and logic. This is the famous Russell’s paradox, which in words is the 
following. Consider a set which contains all sets which do not contain themselves as members. 
Does this set contain itself? If it does, then it does not, and if it does not, then it does. 
 
A popular analogy is the following. Suppose there is a town in which every man either always 
shaves himself, or is always shaved by the barber. This seems to divide the men of the town into 
two neat classes; no man can be in both sets by definition. But what about the barber? If he is a 
man who always shaves himself then he cannot be, since he is also then a man shaved by the 
barber. And if he is a man who is always shaved by the barber, then he will always shave himself, 
which he cannot. 
 
Thus even the definition of quite simple sets is problematic. The problem is surprisingly difficult to 
eliminate, leaving aside solutions such as a barber who does not shave or is a woman. So difficult, 
in fact, that Frege gave up on his own logicist dream. Russell did not. He developed with Alfred 
North Whitehead (1861-1947) a new theory of “types”, which in essence are hierarchical sets. 
This “ramified” theory eliminated the type of paradoxes which bedevilled Frege’s logicism. A set 
could no longer contain itself as a member. In the shaving story, it is as if the town now has a 
caste system, and a man can be shaved only by someone of a lower caste. Thus the barber can 
be shaved by someone of a lower caste, and can shave anyone in a higher caste, but no-one can 
shave themselves (the lowest caste grows beards). 
 
Russell and Whitehead wrote the monumental Principia Mathematica (Russell & Whitehead, 
1910) to bring Frege’s dream to fruition through their ramified theory of typyes. The power of the 
mantle of meaning which mathematics places over logic is revealed by the fact that it takes 378 
pages of dense argument in the Principia to prove (logically) that one plus one equals two. 
 
But despite these Herculean efforts, the dream of reducing mathematics to logic died when Gödel 
rocked the mathematical world in 1931 with the publication of his two incompleteness theorems 
(Gödel, 1931; see also Smoryński, 1977). The first theorem is bad enough news: it says that any 
system which aims to formalise arithmetic must necessarily be incomplete. Incomplete means 
that the system must contain true statements which cannot be proved. And Gödel showed that 
this is true for any system which aimed to formalise arithmetic, and, worse, for any system which 
contained arithmetic. Thus Gödel’s theorem not only destroyed the approach based on a 
combination of logic and ramified types developed by Russell and Whitehead, but all possible 
approaches. This was a profound and philosophically disturbing shock to mathematicians, who 
until that moment believed that all true statements must be provable. Mathematics has not been 
the same since. 
 
Even worse was to come from Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem: it is impossible to prove 
the consistency of arithmetic using only the methods of argument from within arithmetic. Thus to 
prove even the most basic of mathematical areas consistent, that is to show that contradictions  
can never be derived within it, requires stepping outside of that area. But then the new area of 
mathematics used to establish consistency of the first area would itself require external 
techniques in order to establish its consistency, and so on. 
 
Gödel showed that any system which aims to formalise an area of mathematics contains 
unprovable true statements, and whose consistency can only be established by stepping outside 
of itself. Logicism (and not just logicism, as we shall see) seemed well and truly dead. But logicism 
lives on in modified forms; the idea of number as a powerful naming convention for a set of 
interconnected logical objects is closer to what is now called the neo-Fregean standpoint. The 
difference between Fregean logicism and neo-Fregean logicism revolves around “Hume’s 
Principle”, which we do not have the space to consider here; see for example (Bostock, 2009, pp. 
266 ff). Moroever, Russell’s theory of types is now considered the start of predicativism. Both neo-
Fregean logicism and predicativism seek to avoid paradox while retaining logic as fundamental. 
These ideas have been developed for example by Bostock (1980); see also his (2009, section 
5.3). 
 
If in some sense all mathematics can be reduced to logic, what is the ontology of logic? The 
logicist rejects the realist idea that mathematical objects have an independent existence in a 
platonic realm of ideal forms, and substitutes logic as a foundation for mathematics. But this 
merely shifts the ontological question on to logic, and here we see a divergence in the history of 
logicist thought. Its founding father, Frege, was a realist of sorts, since he believed that logic and 
its objects had a platonic existence (Bostock, 2009, chapter 9). Although Russell’s views were 
complex and evolved throughout his life, he also seemed to remain essentially a platonic realist 
when it came to mathematics. Other logicists choose to remain silent on ontology.  
Logicism under the lens 
What can the logicist say about the existence of applied mathematics? If at the heart of 
mathematics we find only logic, and if the familiar objects of mathematics are merely names under 
which hides a Rude Goldberg arrangement of logical objects, then why should mathematics have 
anything useful to say about the real world? The logicist is not allowed to answer that the universe 
is merely an embodiment of a higher platonic realm of logic. To do so makes them a platonist.  
 
There does not seem to be much more to see of logicism under the TEAM lens. At its heart, there 
is either a dormant platonism in its classical form (which Gödel destroyed anyway), or an echoing 
ontological silence in the modern forms. Since these modern forms do not propose any ontology, 
it is hard to critique them via the existence of applied mathematics. However, even they seem to 
have an implied platonism at their heart, since the neo-Fregean adoption of Hume’s principle 
brings with it a notion of infinity which is platonic in the extreme – see Bostock (2009, p. 270) for 
some of the controversy. 
 
Perhaps one observation can be made using the TEAM lens. If even such a simple concept as 
number veils a hidden complexity of logical objects, maybe what mathematicians do is to select 
definitions which excel at encoding logical objects and their interrelations. Having done so, 
perhaps mathematics is then a process of selection and evolution. This principle of fecundity and 
an evolutionary perspective is sufficiently general that it may apply in a broad sense to other 
schools in the philosophy of mathematics. However, it has problems. For a start, what is the 
ontological status of the fecund objects upon which evolution acts? Secondly, there are 
epistemological problems with the claim (see for example Mohr, 1977) that minds with the best 
model of reality are those which are selected as fittest evolutionarily. It is not clear that the objects 
of the human mind need faithfully represent the objects of the physical universe. Mental maps of 
reality survive not because they are faithful to reality, but because of the advantage they conferred 
to our ancestors in their struggles to survive and to mate. Moreover, while concepts such as 
number and causality have obvious correlates in the real world, our modern theories of physics 
involve concepts which have no obvious correlates in the real world, such as complex analysis or 
the common-sense defying nature of quantum mechanics. 
Formalism 
The formalist holds a radical ontological perspective: mathematical objects have no real 
existence, they are merely symbols. The mathematician shuffles and recombines these 
meaningless symbols according to the dictates of systems of postulates. No meaning is ever to 
be ascribed to the symbols or the statements in which they appear, nor is any kind of interpretation 
of these symbols or statements ever to be done. Some formalists may be content to remain 
agnostic on whether meaning can ever be ascribed to mathematical symbols and statements, 
preferring simply to insist that no meaning is necessary, that the symbols and their interrelations 
suffice. Others, more radically still, insist that no meaning can ever be given to mathematical 
symbols and statements, and the systems in which they are used. 
 
These symbols are manipulated within systems of postulates and rules, the formal systems which 
give formalists their moniker. The formalist is in theory able to study any formal system, but usually 
certain restrictions are placed on what counts as a postulate, and what is an allowable rule. One 
of the main criteria for a formal system is the concept of consistency which we have already 
encountered. 
  
A formal system is consistent when its axioms and rules do not allow the deduction of a 
contradiction. In the early days of the formalist school, its leader, David Hilbert (1862-1943) 
believed that consistency implied existence (Bostock, 2009, p. 168). It is hard to discern what is 
meant by “existence” here, given the formalist insistence on the meaningless of mathematics – 
indeed, Hilbert himself seems somewhat agnostic on this point (Reid, 1996). However, I take it to 
mean that any statement derived from the axioms and rules has (at the very least) the same 
ontological existence as the axioms themselves. Thus while mathematics may be seen as one 
among many formal systems, and while each can be studied in the same way, if the axioms of 
mathematics are shown to have a more significant existence then so do all other mathematical 
objects. 
 
It is impossible to talk about formalism without talking about Hilbert. The school probably would 
not exist without him. Hilbert was a towering figure of 19th and 20th Century mathematics, and his 
name is attached to several important concepts and theories (Reid, 1996). He is also famous for 
listing 23 open problems in mathematics in the published form of his address to the International 
Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900 (Hilbert, 1902). Many of Hilbert’s problems are still 
unanswered and remain the focus of research today. Hilbert in 1920 began his so-called program 
to show that mathematics is a consistent formal system. As we have seen, Gödel would show a 
decade later that this is impossible. 
 
Hilbert was already on the formalist track when in 1899 he published his Grundlagen der 
Geometrie (The Foundations of Geometry) (Hilbert, 1899), in which he formulated axioms of 
Euclidean geometry and showed their consistency. Hilbert is not the only mathematician to 
axiomatize Euclid’s geometry. The idea is to eliminate geometrical intuition from geometry and to 
replace that intuition with definitions and axioms about objects bearing geometrical names. From 
those postulates can be derived all the theorems of Euclid’s geometry, but crucially and as a direct 
result of the formulation of geometry as a formal system, those theorems need no longer be taken 
as referring to geometrical objects in the real world. In fact, they need not even be taken as 
referring to any kind of abstract geometry, neither to the platonist’s ideal geometry, not to the 
aristotelian’s geometry generalised from the real world. Although the postulates use words such 
as “line” and “point”, these objects are only defined by the formal system, and are not supposed 
to be taken as referring to our everyday notion of lines and points. The words could just as easily 
be replaced by “lavender” and “porpoise” – but again, without any sense that there is any 
correspondence with lavender or porpoises in the real world. This is the start of the formalist 
dream.  
 
It was no great surprise when Hilbert showed in his Foundations of Geometry that Euclidean 
geometry was consistent. At the time, the only area of mathematics over which there was any 
doubt as to its consistency was Georg Cantor’s (1845-1918) theory of infinite numbers (Bostock, 
2009, p.168). To introduce this theory, we first need to consider the notion of countability. 
 
A finite set is countable if it can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with a subset of the 
natural numbers. This is a formal definition of what it means to count the objects in the set. 
Counting means assigning each object a unique number, which puts them in a one-to-one 
correspondence with a subset of the natural numbers, say the subset of numbers from 1 to 10 if 
there are 10 objects in the set. If the set is infinite, we call it countable if it can be placed in one-
to-one correspondence with all of the natural numbers (not just a subset). (Some authors reserve 
countable for finite sets and call countable infinite sets enumerable.) 
 
The concept of countability puts infinity within our grasp. If the elements in an infinite set can be 
paired with the counting numbers, then an incremental counting-type algorithmic process can be 
set up to “access” everything in the set. For every element in the set there is a unique positive 
whole number, and for every positive whole number there is a unique object. However, this 
immediately leads to apparent paradoxes. For example, the even natural numbers can be paired 
in an obvious way with the natural numbers, and are thus countable. This means that the size of 
the set of even natural numbers is the same as the size of the set of all natural numbers, despite 
the fact that the latter contains all of the former! 
 
Cantor asked whether the set of all numbers is countable. This set of real numbers contains not 
just the natural numbers, but all integers, all rational numbers, and all irrational numbers. He 
assumed first that the reals are countable, in which case, by definition they can be listed alongside 
the natural numbers. The next step was Cantor’s stroke of genius. He considered a real number 
whose decimal expansion differs from the first real number on the list in the first decimal place, 
from the second real number in the second decimal place, and so on for every decimal place. 
This number is therefore different from every number on the list, and so it is not on the list. Yet it 
is a real number, and so if the assumption of the countability of the reals were correct it is on the 
list. This contradiction implies that the assumption of countability was wrong, and Cantor 
concluded that the reals are uncountable. Stunningly, this means that there is a “bigger size” of 
infinity than the size of the set of natural numbers. Moreover, Cantor showed that there is an 
infinite succession of sizes of infinities, each bigger than the last, and he constructed a beautiful 
theory of these infinite numbers. Within this theory, his famous continuum hypothesis is that the 
second smallest size of infinity is the size of the set of real numbers (Bagaria, 2008) 
 
Hilbert so loved Cantor’s theory that he desired that “[n]o one shall drive us out of the paradise 
which Cantor has created” (Hilbert, 1926, p. 170), and so he was desperate to prove its 
consistency. He never did so, and Gödel incompleteness theorems showed its impossibility 
before Hilbert had even finished shoring up the foundations of arithmetic. As Hilbert waded 
through the mud he found in the formalist foundations, he repeatedly encountered the notion of 
infinity. Although he hoped to construct an edifice which up to Cantor’s theory, Hilbert did not want 
infinity in the formalist foundations on which he built. Hilbert could not prove the consistency of 
arithmetic based on a finitary formal system. This insistence that as a finite human in an 
apparently finite world we should use only “finitary” definitions and methods will recur in our final 
school of mathematical philosophy, intuitionism, to which Hilbert ironically was bitterly opposed.  
 
The death blow for Hilbert and the formalist’s dream came with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, 
as described in the Logicism section above. These theorems not only destroyed the logicist dream 
of a mathematics founded on (and in some sense no more than) logic, but simultaneously 
destroyed Hilbert’s formalism. This is because the theorems showed that any formal system 
sophisticated enough to contain simple arithmetic would necessarily contain unprovable true 
statements, and whose consistency required an external system. There was no way out, and 
formalism was dead. 
 
Consequently, it is unlikely that anyone would call themselves a formalist today (Bostock, 2009, 
p. 195). The idea which died is that formal systems are primary in the sense that they are the 
object of study, and that any application of them to an area of mathematics is essentially 
meaningless. But formalism evolved and survived in the same way that dinosaurs both died out 
and are alive in the birds we see around us. One surviving form is structuralism. The idea behind 
it, as advanced by Dedekind (1888) and Benacerraf (1965) is that the common structures of 
particular areas of mathematics are the object of study; they are primary. Like the formalist, the 
structuralist believes that applications of the structures are secondary, and that it is the structures 
themselves which must be studied. For example, the natural numbers can be taken to be an 
example of a progression: a non-empty set of objects each of which has a successor, as 
formalised in Peano’s Axioms (Gowers, 2008, pp. 258-9). Because natural numbers are an 
example of a progression, they are less interesting to the structuralist than the progression 
structure they model. 
 
The idea of structure being fundamental seems to be attractive to some physicists, even if they 
do not necessarily acknowledge structuralism. Writing popular accounts of the power of 
mathematics in the physical sciences, people like John Barrow, David Deutsch, and Ian Stewart 
argue for the primacy of pattern or structure. For example, Deutsch (b. 1953), a mathematical 
physicist, argues that the human brain both embodies the mathematical relationships and causal 
structure of physical objects such as quasars, and that this embodiment becomes more accurate 
over time. This happens because our study of these objects aligns the structure of our brains with 
the structure of the objects themselves, with mathematics as the encoding language of structure 
(Deutsch, 2011). What is the ontology of such structures? The question is somewhat avoided by 
structuralists, but in essence they must claim either a platonic existence for them, or one of the 
other positions detailed here. Thus any claims of the structuralist are subject to some of the same 
ontological and epistemological objections as the other schools herein. 
 
Finally here, we consider not a variant of logicism but a subschool which has in common with 
logicism the denial of any meaning in the objects of mathematics. In the Logicism section I said 
that logicism could be considered to be one form of nominalism. Another is given in Field (1980); 
see also Bostock (1979). By this account, mathematics is a “fairytale world which has no genuine 
reality” (Bostock, 2009, p.262). In this fairytale wold, numbers (and other mathematical concepts) 
are powerful names for a collection of underlying objects and structures. These names allow us 
to use, say, arithmetic rather than logic or set theory in our deductions. This use of arithmetic as 
a set of names and rules is conservative in the sense that we cannot prove anything in arithmetic 
that could not be proved by stripping away the arithmetical names and working with a more 
fundamental structure (such as logic). Thus the names are useful but not required, and no 
meaning is given to them. Moreover, even if it is a useful fiction to treat them as real, the things 
to which the names seem to point have no independent existence; they may be abstractions of 
some kind, but they are not real in the sense of having an independent platonic existence. 
 
Of course, we sometimes choose names which correspond to things in the real world. We know 
about numbers when we count shirt buttons, which is a kind of instrumentalist view of the 
existence of numbers. Thus arithmetic can be taken to be about the countable things we 
encounter in the world, whose ontological status is either left vague or has a minimalist 
instrumentalist view. Any correctly derived arithmetical statements are true both of numbers as 
fictions and of real-world numbers. Arithmetical deductions which go beyond what can be 
encountered in the world are true, but only in some fictional sense. 
Formalism under the lens 
If mathematics is a game, why should it tell us anything about the world? To the pure formalist, 
mathematical objects have no “real” existence, and to do mathematics is simply to explore a 
formal system or systems. But no particular formal system should be privileged over any other – 
some may be more interesting than others, for sure, but none of them is taken to have any special 
ontological status. Why, then, does mathematics help to explain the world? 
 
The only way out of this conundrum seems to be to take Hilbert’s less hard line view in which 
mathematical objects have a special ontological status, and that the formal system or systems at 
the foundations of mathematics are therefore more special than others. Although this does fix one 
problem, it creates another: what does it mean for mathematical objects to have special 
ontological status? What is that ontological status? The options are presumably those held by 
one of the other schools of the philosophy of mathematics and therefore subject to the same 
criticisms under the TEAM lens (amongst others). 
 
Putting those criticisms to one side, and playing devil’s advocate, I could point out that some 
games do teach us about the world. For example, in 1970 Martin Gardner introduced the world to 
John Conway’s “Game of Life” (Gardner, 1970). Since that time, this simple game has become a 
field of study both in its own right and as a model for processes in biology, economics, physics, 
and computer science, as revealed by a quick search of Google Scholar. But although some 
features of the Game of Life are emergent and therefore could not be predicted, the simple rules 
of the game were chosen in order to mimic those of simple real-world systems. If we wish to claim 
that this is comparable to the far more complex game of mathematics mimicking the real world, 
then we would have to assert that the rules of mathematics were chosen in order to mimic those 
in the real world. Once again, we are forced to abandon the ontology of pure formalism, at least. 
 
Other problems are visible under the TEAM lens. While it is easy to accept that, say, the rules of 
arithmetic have been chosen because they mimic real-world counting, it is harder to explain the 
important role that, say, complex analysis or Hilbert spaces play in our best theories of the 
universe. In geometry, it is “natural” to consider flat Euclidean geometry, and so the non-Euclidean 
geometry which arose in the last half of the 19th century was viewed initially with distaste and seen 
as something of a pointless game. Yet Einstein has taught us that our universe is non-Euclidean. 
How, then, are we to know which of our formal systems have special ontological status? Only 
those which are later shown to correspond to some aspect of the real world? But this is surely a 
poor ontological status which seems predicated both on time and on our ignorance. What if when 
our theories change we need an area of mathematics and so it becomes “real” – but then later 
find we no longer need it, at which it returns to being unreal? It seems that this is indistinguishable 
from the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument, and so arguments against that position are 
also valid here. 
 
The structuralist might choose to argue that the structures of mathematics are chosen because 
they mimic some aspect of the real world. But does this not give a privileged ontological status to 
the real world, and the structures within it? What is their ontological status? At this point, the 
structuralist has passed the buck. The fictionalist seems Quinean when examined under the 
TEAM lens, for the only way to distinguish between the real and the fictional is to expose a truth 
to the crucible of the real world. The other option is to admit a platonic existence at the heart of 
your fictionalist worldview, as Field himself did when he sought to remove it in Field (1992). 
Intuitionism 
Intuitionism was the first and remains the largest “constructivist” schools of mathematics (Chabert, 
2008). Most of what I say in this section can be taken to be true of the other constructivist schools, 
which include (i) finitism, (ii) the Russian recursive mathematics of Shanin and Markov, (iii) 
Bishop’s constructive analysis, and (iv) constructive set theory. It is always a pleasure to note that 
intuitionists claim constructivism as a subschool and constructivists claim intuitionists likewise, 
but I will mostly use the word “intuitionism” as an umbrella term in this section, and look forward 
to the deluge it provokes from constructivists. 
 
The defining characteristic of intuitionism is that existence requires construction. The perspective 
of intuitionists, for example in Bridges (1999), is that believing that existence requires construction 
forces upon the mathematician the requirement to use a different logic. This logic is the 
intuitionistic logic which has at its heart a rejection of the law of excluded middle and a rejection 
of the axiom of choice. I will explain each of these points below. It is worth noting that, as in every 
area we discuss herein, the argument for intuitionism has at least two sides. For every Bridges 
arguing that construction implies intuitionistic logic, there is a Dummett arguing that this is untrue 
(see his 1977, and Bostock, 2009, pp 215 ff). But we continue, since all schools presented herein 
have adherents arguing their corner and antagonists arguing them into one. 
 
All mathematicians distinguish between an existence proof and a construction proof. The former 
merely establishes whether a statement is true or not. A construction proof, by contrast, gives 
steps which construct the properties of the object in question, and so gives in addition to a proof 
of truth some insight as to why. In the case in which the statement is not true, an actual 
counterexample is constructed. I now try to put a little flesh on these bones. 
 
A common question in mathematics concerns the existence of a mathematical object. This is not 
the metaphysical notion of existence central to this chapter. When a mathematician asks whether 
a mathematical object exists, she is not worried about whether scientific methods can show it to 
be a real, physical thing in the world, nor is she usually bothered with the ontological status of that 
object. Instead, she is interested in whether the object exists in a mathematical sense.  
 
For the majority of mathematicians, existence proofs suffice, even if construction proofs provide 
more information. Not so the intuitionists, who believe that existence is shown only when the 
object has been constructed. Construction here has a specific meaning, and once again this has 
nothing to do with building an object in the real world. Rather it has to do with providing a proof of 
a statement from which, at least in principle, an algorithm could be extracted which would compute 
the object in question, and any of its properties. Only when a constructive proof has been found 
is the object said to exist. For the intuitionist, “existence” means “construction”. 
 
For a real-world analogy, we can turn the weather. When I look up the weather records for my 
home town of Christchurch, New Zealand, I can see that in 2016 the maximum recorded 
temperature was 34oC on 27th February, and the minimum recorded temperature was -5oC on 
11th August (WolframAlpha, 2017). This means that with confidence I can claim that there was a 
moment between 27th February and 11th August when the temperature was precisely 0oC. My 
assertion rests on two points: that for this time range the temperature starts at a positive value 
(34) and ends on a negative one (-5), and that temperature cannot instantaneously change. From 
these two observations, I know that there must exist a time, however short, when the thermometer 
read 0o, since it is impossible to go smoothly from 34 down to -5 without passing through 0. Of 
course, there were probably many such times, but the mathematician’s interest in uniqueness is 
not our concern here, only existence. In our temperature analogy we have demonstrated the 
existence of a time at which the temperature was 0o in a way which would satisfy most 
mathematicians. 
 
But the intuitionist weather-watcher would not be satisfied. She wants something more: she wants 
an actual moment at which the thermometer read 0. In our analogy, this means going through the 
weather station data until such a time is found. That is a “constructive” proof of the existence of a 
0o time. 
 
Our analogy has flaws, as all do. It could give the impression that intuitionistic mathematics is 
about data-sifting; this is untrue. Intuitionistic mathematics is mathematics, but with tighter 
constraints on what can be used in the logical arguments called proofs which establish truths. 
Indeed, Bridges argues in his (1999) that the intuitionistic mathematician is free to work with 
whatever mathematical objects she so desires. Another flaw is that although the analogy 
illustrates the difference between existence and construction, it does not have an analogy for 
intuitionistic logic. 
 
I said above that intuitionistic logic has two features which distinguish it from classical logic, and 
both features involve a rejection. The first of these is a rejection of the law of excluded middle 
(LEM). For most mathematicians, something either is, or is not. A number is either rational, or 
irrational. It cannot be both; it is either. But the intuitionist will not say it is one or the other until it 
has been constructed. A classical mathematician may present the following argument. Object X 
can either have property P or not. If we assume for the sake of argument that it has property P, 
we can investigate the consequences of our assumption. Suppose that when we do that, we 
uncover a contradiction, an absurdity. Then (assuming we have done everything correctly) the 
only problem was our assumption that object X had property P. Thus it cannot have property P. 
This is the commonly used proof technique called proof by contradiction, and we saw an example 
of it above when we presented Cantor’s diagonal argument. 
  
Such a proof would not be considered valid in intuitionistic logic. The reason that it is invalid is 
that X has not been shown to have a particular property or not, but simply that by assuming the 
converse a contradiction has been found. At issue is not the assumption of whether or not X has 
property P. If the objects of study of which X is an example are such that they must either have 
property P or not, then it would be absurd to argue that they have neither, or, somehow, a 
superposition of both. The intuitionist does not argue this. Rather, the idea is of a radical 
redefinition of truth. To the intuitionist mathematician, a statement is true only when a constructive 
proof without recourse to the LEM has been given. A statement is false precisely when a 
counterexample has been given. Since truth now has this specific meaning, a statement is neither 
true nor false until such a constructive proof is furnished.  
 
Although the truth of a statement becomes time-dependent, it is not the same time-dependency 
as in the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. There, something is real only for as long as it 
is necessary for a successful theory of the real world; the status of mathematical objects are 
forever conditional. For the intuitionist, on the other hand, truth is defined to mean proof by 
construction. Thus an object is neither real nor not real until it is constructed, at which point it 
becomes and forever remains real (or becomes and remains forever not real when a 
counterexample is constructed). 
 
To object that surely, say, the statement “the trillionth decimal digit of pi is zero” has been true or 
false since the dawn of time is to confuse the platonic notion of truth with the intuitionist one. The 
point is that although the trillionth decimal digit of pi has a value entirely independent of the free 
will of humans, that it is indeed dictated by something deeper than whatever human whimsy may 
want it to be, until its value is actually calculated the statement has no (intuitionist) truth value 
associated with it.  
 
Although for the intuitionist mathematical objects have properties which can be rigorously defined 
or derived, they nevertheless have the ontological status of being purely mental objects. In this 
way, intuitionism is a form of the conceptualism which harks back to Aristotle (Bostock, 2009, p. 
44). By making mathematics mental, intuitionists avoid problems of epistemic access, since 
naturally we can access the objects of our own minds. There is an ontological issue associated 
with insisting that mathematical objects are purely mental. We must ask why they have properties 
independent of the individual mind which explores or creates them. Thus an obvious objection to 
this conceptualism is that these objects must rely on some deeper structure that at the very least 
is shared by other human minds. But that suggests that there is something more fundamental 
than the mathematics itself – and the intuitionist certainly cannot claim that something like logic, 
language, “structure”, or a platonic realm of ideas is more fundamental. 
 
Indeed, the founder of intuitionism, Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881-1966), echoing Kant and 
in agreement with the mathematicians Felix Klein (1849-1925) and Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), 
believed that the basic axioms of mathematics are intuited. In this he meant that they were known 
to our minds, but not that our intuition reveals anything which exists outside of the mind. He went 
further, claiming a stark independence of mathematics from both language and logic. If there was 
any relation there, it was that logic and language rested on mathematics, rather than the other 
way around. This was revolutionary, and put Brouwer directly in harm’s way. His point of view, 
given in Brouwer (1907), was directly contrary to both logicism and to Hilbert’s program of 
formalism as it developed in the 1920s. Hilbert’s program was popular and Hilbert himself was 
powerful. Brouwer apparently did nothing other than disagree with Hilbert, yet Hilbert had Brouwer 
removed from the editorial board of the prestigious journal Mathematische Annalen, and sought 
to discredit him at every turn (van Dalen, 2008, p.800).  
 
Having discussed construction, the law of excluded middle, and the redefinition of “truth”, I now 
consider the other idea which intuitionists reject, the axiom of choice. Stated in words, it says that 
we can always select an element from each of a family of sets. This is uncontroversial for a finite 
family of finite sets, but becomes controversial otherwise, because an infinite number of choices 
can be made. For most mathematicians this is not a problem; to put it crudely, the fact that there 
are an infinite number of choices which can be made guarantees that one can be made. For an 
intuitionist, the mere fact that a choice can be made is not enough: the choice must be specified 
in order to count as a construction. Yet when a classical mathematician invokes the axiom of 
choice it is usually for very general cases in which specificity is impossible. 
 
To make this point clearer, suppose we have a countable number of sets, each of which is 
countable. Now suppose that we wish to form a superset containing all of the elements in all of 
the sets and to ask whether that new set is itself countable. This is easy for a classical 
mathematician. For each set, she first lists the elements, which we know can be done because 
every set in the family is countable. Then she runs the lists together in turn, and hey presto, the 
superset is listed out, and therefore countable. There is no “problem” with this proof for most 
mathematicians, but the intuitionist asks: how did she choose the ordering for each set, and for 
the family of sets? There is an infinite number of choices in each case, so the choice function is 
unspecified. The proof uses (in quite a disguised way) the axiom of choice. Whenever the axiom 
of choice is used, the proof is non-constructive. 
 
Uncountable infinity is the heart of the rejections which define intuitionism. To be clear, if the 
axiom of choice is invoked either in a finite context or in one which is countable, then a choice 
function can be defined and the intuitionist is happy. The problem is in the uncountable case. 
Likewise, the law of excluded middle is connected with the notion of infinity; recently Bridges has 
argued that the continuum hypothesis implies LEM (Bridges, 2016). Only potential infinities, 
namely those accessible through enumeration or by an algorithmic process are acceptable to the 
intuitionist. 
 
But to return to our starting point that intuitionistic mathematics is mathematics done with 
intuitionistic logic, we note that it is sometimes possible to construct intuitionistic theories of 
mathematical objects which in classical mathematics require uncountable infinities. For example, 
Brouwer introduced the notion of choice sequences to create a theory of the continuum (that is, 
the real number line) which was apparently out of reach to intuitionists (Brouwer, 1981). Brouwer 
never defined choice sequences carefully enough to avoid problems, but Bishop’s constructive 
mathematics (Bishop, 1967, Bishop & Bridges 1985) does contain an apparently sound theory of 
the reals which avoids uncountable infinities. This is an example of how something which in 
classical mathematics requires uncountable infinities can be given an intuitionistic theory which 
only uses countable processes. 
Intuitionism under the lens 
Intuitionism has never been popular with mathematicians, and few applied mathematicians insist 
on a constructive approach to their work. But is it possible to argue that intuitionistic logic’s 
insistence on countability, apparently so true of our physical universe, is the reason for the 
success of mathematics in modelling the world? 
 
Does the universe only appear to rely on countability, and so are there unavoidable instances of 
uncountable infinities, both in our theories of the world and in the universe itself? Since infinity is 
implied in our best theories of the very big and the very small, it is no wonder that when intuitionism 
is under the TEAM lens what comes into focus is quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity 
(GR).  
 
It may seem that on a large scale our universe is a finite (though huge) thing containing a finite 
number (though huge) of discrete things. But we do not know that to be a fact. At the other end 
of the scale, quantum mechanics suggests that the structure of spacetime is granular at the very 
smallest of time and length scales. However, that prediction has not yet been verified. It may be 
the result of our most successful and accurate theory of science, but we do not know it to be true. 
Could the universe be infinite in extent? Might spacetime be a continuum? 
 
Continuous spacetime does not necessarily cause a fatal problem for intuitionism since Bishop’s 
constructive mathematics has an intuitionistic theory of continua. A potentially deeper argument, 
given by Hellman (1993, 1997), that intuitionism must be wrong because QM requires a theory of 
unbounded operators which seems to defy intuitionism, has been refuted by Bridges (1995, 1999) 
on the grounds that such a theory is possible with an intuitionistic approach. These Hellman-type 
arguments have also been refuted in the context of GR: see Billinge’s (2000) response to Hellman 
(1998). However, what of mathematical objects essential to our theories of the universe but for 
which no intuitionistic theory has yet been found? Does their necessity destroy intuitionism? 
Billinge (2000) says no, when she powerfully argues that just because we have not yet found a 
constructive proof of something does not mean that it cannot ever be found.  
 
The intuitionist’s belief that the objects of mathematics are purely mental avoids the plantonist’s 
problem of epistemological access. But the TEAM lens shows us a deeper ontological problem: 
if the objects of mathematics are purely mental, why should they ever have any correspondence 
with the real world? Why should mathematics ever be useful? 
Discussion and conclusion 
The platonist see mathematics as eternal and changeless, existing outside of spacetime. But how 
do we access such an ideal realm? How does this ideal realm cast the physical “shadows” in our 
world which mathematics explains? The logicist reduces mathematics to logic in disguise. But 
why should logic explain the world? Does logic have a platonic existence? The formalist is the 
ultimate reductionist, claiming that mathematics is naught but a game, a meaningless shuffling of 
semantically empty symbols. But why should the game of mathematics be able to explain the 
world? Why that game and not another? Finally, conceptualism returns with the intuitionists, who 
believe that only construction means truth. But while intuitionistic logic and an insistence on 
construction are not at odds with our best theories of the universe (our best applied mathematics), 
the intuitionist believes that all mathematical objects are mental constructions. Why should such 
mental constructions explain the world? 
 
This last point is subtle, and slippery. Of course we expect that any idea which explains the world 
will be in our minds; that is where we experience ideas. The issue concerns how an idea can 
come to mimic and explain the outside world. This is a debate with a long history. In the middle 
stand two figures directly opposed to one another. Kant believed that our minds are primary, and 
thus that our applied mathematics works not because our minds come to mirror reality, but 
because reality must conform to the mind in order to be perceptible and comprehensible to us. 
By contrast, Hume was an empiricist, naturalist, and sceptic, who believed that our concepts came 
from experience of an independently-existing natural world, without imposing an ontology on that 
world. At the far end of the chronology is Plato, who believed that our mental realm can access a 
world of forms which projects the physical world. This raises more questions than it answers. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be the perspective of many theoretical physicists today, perhaps without 
considering its epistemic problems. The modern structuralist, by contrast, might argue that 
structure is fundamental, and so our mental world can be structured to mimic the external world. 
We have already observed in the Formalism section that such a perspective seems to pass the 
buck on the ontological status of structure. This structuralist approach seems attractive to 
physicists such as Deutsch, who we encountered in our discussion of structuralism above, and 
who otherwise seems to be a realist in his worldview. 
 
When physicists make pronouncements about mathematics they are usually motivated not by 
concern about what mathematics is or what its foundations are, but only by what sort of 
mathematics should or can be taken to be the foundation of physics. For example, the Nobel 
laureate in Physics Gerard ’t Hooft (b. 1946)  wants only finiteness in his theories of quantum 
mechanics (Musser, 2013). It is not completely clear what he means by this, but it seems to be a 
kind of countability, since he mentions basing theory on the integers or finite sets (though the 
former is countably infinite). ‘t Hooft seems to be directly motivated by the granular discreteness 
of spacetime at the Planck scale predicted by QM. It would be wrong to suggest that he is rejecting 
classical mathematics and a platonic ontology in favour of, say, neo-Fregean logic, intuitionism, 
or a Hilbertean finitism, when he is only restricting himself to finite methods and objects for the 
mathematics of QM. He says nothing about the ontological status of other mathematics. Likewise, 
the physicist Lee Smolin (b. 1955) claims in his (2000) that topos theory is “required” for 
cosmology, and topos theory itself requires constructive set theory, a form of intuitionism. Once 
again, this is not a statement of ontological intent for the whole of mathematics, just for what 
mathematics can be applied to physics. In both cases, the question of epistemology is left open, 
as is the ontological status of the objects being studied. However, without acknowledging the 
philosophical position they adopt it is possible that applied mathematicians such as these 
physicists are overlooking some difficulties, especially when combining ideas from different 
philosophical schools. This seems particularly acute when the physical objects are considered 
real but the mathematics used to model them is considered to be entirely mental. Note that neither 
of these physicists claim that the mathematics which helps them is the only mathematics which 
is true; there is no evidence that they adhere to the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. 
 
The TEAM lens reveals other issues which we have not discussed above. For example, it is one 
thing to say that applied mathematics is possible, but we could also ask why we are able to do it. 
Why is the mathematics which seems to do so well at explaining the world accessible to our 
minds? We can imagine a universe in which rational, intelligent beings existed who were 
incapable of developing sufficiently advanced mathematics to understand that universe even 
though it were capable of being comprehended mathematically. 
 
Also, what about beauty, or the role of aesthetics? This is a commonly-observed inspiration for 
both mathematicians and those who apply mathematics. The mathematician GH Hardy (1877-
1947) said of mathematics “Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for 
ugly mathematics” (Hardy, 1940). Einstein is quoted in Farmelo (2002, p. xii) as saying “the only 
physical theories that we are willing to accept are the beautiful ones”, while physicist colleague 
Hermann Weyl (1885-1955) said “My work has always tried to unite the true with the beautiful and 
when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful” (quoted in Stewart, 2007, p. 
278). But why should an aesthetic of mathematics help create new mathematics, and new applied 
mathematics? Are we simply wrong about beauty, especially when we use it as a selection 
criterion, and that ugly theories could better explain the world, and even be more fecund 
mathematically? Perhaps we have been misled by mathematics because we are in the early days 
of science; are we even wrong about the power of mathematics to explain the world? 
 
Another question we have overlooked as we peered down the TEAM lens concerns the meaning 
of deductive steps in an applied mathematical argument. More specifically, if I have a 
mathematical model of a physical process which I then analyse mathematically to arrive at a 
physically-verifiable result, need each of the intermediate logical steps also have physical 
meaning? This question has been considered by Nancy Cartwright, among others; see for 
example her (1984), in which she says “derivations do not provide maps of causal processes. A 
derivation may start with the basic equations that govern a phenomenon. It may be highly 
accurate, and extremely realistic. Yet it may not pass through the causes.” This question, and the 
others raised above, deserve more attention. 
Conclusion 
We do not know the ontological or epistemological status of mathematical objects. We do not 
know why mathematics can be applied to the world around us. Though it was too much to hope 
that the TEAM lens would itself provide an experimentum crucis which would eliminate all but one 
philosophy of mathematics and therefore resolve a millennia-old debate, the TEAM lens has 
brought into focus the questions which must be clearly addressed when defending a particular 
philosophical standpoint. 
 
I have attempted to summarise the systems of ideas which constitute these standpoints in four 
broad schools. Despite presenting them as separate, they are united in their concern with the 
ontological and epistemological questions, and in their focus on key ideas: what is number, what 
is a set, what is a proof, what is infinity, and more besides. As we saw, one person who has united 
them in a stunningly destructive way was Kurt Gödel. 
 
Another figure may pull some of these strands together. Max Tegmark introduced the radically 
realist Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, which earns him a capital P on Platonist if anyone ever 
deserves it. The MUH is a tentative, new, and controversial idea, and my positive view of it may 
not be representative. But I do think it takes seriously these philosophical questions and that it 
represents an important attempt to think clearly about them, and possibly to unite some of the 
schools. For example, structuralists and fictionalists might observe that in the MUH all 
mathematical objects exist and all things which exist are mathematical, and so there is no need 
for any particular structure or fiction to be privileged. Even the debate between Kantian innateness 
and Humean empiricism may be erased: if the mind is a self-aware substructure of the 
mathematical universe, then there is no epistemic gap between the mind and the world. For 
plantoists, the problem of epistemological access may be solved because the MUH is more than 
plenitudinous platonism, which addressed the epistemic concerns. However, it also potentially 
fixes the platonist ontological issues and leaves us with an inspiring thought: if everything is 
mathematics and mathematics is everything, then there is only one realm. We are self-aware 
substructures of mathematics.  
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